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Medieval English law 
 
[The opening overhead for this lecture was a suitably sensational picture of a gentleman 
receiving a blow to the head with an axe.] Suppose this were a contemporary artist's drawing 
of timber-workers in medieval rural England. And suppose the incident depicted led to the 
death of the gentleman who has just been struck. Is it murder? Is it manslaughter? Is it merely 
an accidental killing? The answer to those questions, curiously enough, depends not just on 
the facts, but on how far back in time you wish to go. 
 
At all times in the history of medieval English law, homicides were divided into two 
classes. There were particularly heinous homicides, for which the penalty was death, and less 
serious homicides, for which the death penalty could be escaped. For these less serious 
homicides the penalty was usually financial. In earlier times, the killer and his kin paid 
financial compensation to the victim's kin as well as a fine to the king. In later times, the 
killer was exiled from the realm and his property was forfeited to his lord.1
 
 
Homicide in medieval English Law 
 
Date 
AD 
Death  
penalty 
Distinguishing 
feature 
Financial 
penalty 
Defences 
1050 secret  
murder 
covert killing  
1250 secret  
murder 
covert ‘voluntary’ 
homicide 
accident  
self-defence 
1350 murder planned chance-medley accident  
self-defence 
1550 murder deliberate manslaughter + mistake  
of fact 
 
Anglo-Saxon Law 
 
If you want to travel back to Anglo-Saxon times, to the first millennium AD, it was 
entirely beside the point whether a killing was deliberate, careless or accidental.2
                                                          
1Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (16 vols), vol ii (London 1903; 1982) pp 45-48, 358; vol iii 
(London 1908, 1977) p 303. 
 What 
mattered was whether the killer hid the body or denied the killing; that is, whether the killing 
was covert or overt. A covert homicide was a sure sign of the most guilty of circumstances. 
Only covert killings warranted the Latin term murdrum (Anglo-Saxon morth) in those times. 
This term means `murder', but we now usually translate it `secret murder' to highlight its 
2 Holdsworth ii 51-52. 
distinguishing feature. The penalty for secret murder was death. All other killings were 
atoned for by the payment of blood-money. 
 
13th century English law 
 
It was only in the 13th century that the English common law recognised accident and 
self-defence as mitigating circumstances in criminal trials. In those circumstances, the killing 
was not the, voluntary' act of the killer. But even then, involuntary killers needed to receive a 
pardon from the king: they were guilty of crime, but the crime was pardonable. Even when 
pardoned of the criminal offence, the involuntary killer could face a civil action on behalf of 
the kin of the person killed.3
 
 
Some killings were, of course, authorised by law; such as the hanging of convicted 
murderers. Felons could be killed if that was the only way to effect their arrest. And if our 
overhead showed a forester acting with some enthusiasm in the arrest of a trespassing tree-
feller, then he too would be cleared of homicide by a late 13th century statute of Edward I.4
 
 
Even in the 13th century, the most serious form of homicide was still secret murder. All 
other culpable homicides were lumped together. A death which was the result of mere 
negligence was treated the same way as one which was the result of a deliberate intent to 
kill.5
 
 
14th century English law 
 
It is only in the 14th century that the question of the intent of the killer became important. 
It is in this period that we see the rise of the concept of `malice aforethought'. Put at its 
simplest, malice aforethought indicated that the defendant had planned and carried out the 
killing in cold blood.6
 
 But there was still no distinction drawn between a deliberate killing in 
hot-blood and a death as the result of negligence. 
Self-defence continued to exculpate the killer, as did accident. So, for example, Sir 
William Holdsworth notes that by the mid-fifteenth century it was considered to be a mere 
accident if "a man is cutting his trees and by accident they fall on some one's head and kill 
him."7
 
 
But even where the killer was pardoned on the grounds of accident, this only saved him 
from exile or death. He was still liable to forfeit all his goods. This was declared to be the law 
as late as the case of Beaulieu v Finglam, which was decided in the year 1400.8
                                                          
3 Holdsworth iii 311, 313. 
 In that case, 
counsel for the defendant complained that his client would be ruined if his possessions were 
taken from him, and that this seemed harsh given his client was blameless. To this the Chief 
4 Holdsworth iii 312, citing 21 Edward I st 2. 
5 Holdsworth ii 359. 
6 Even that is disputed for this period, with some scholars suggesting that all 'wicked' killings were lumped 
together and only accidental killings during unlawful acts came within the definition of 'chance-medley'. See the 
discussion in David Sellar, `Forethocht Felony, Malice Aforethought and the Classification of Homicide', in 
WM Gordon and TD Fergus ed Legal History in the Making - proceedings of the ninth British Legal History 
Conference, Glasgow 1989 (London and Rio Grande 1991), chapter 4, pp 43-59. 
7 Holdsworth iii 313. 
8 YB 2 Henry N 18,6: cited in JH Wigmore `Responsibility for tortious acts: its history' [(1984) 7 Harvard Law 
Review 315, 383, 441; reprinted in] Selected Essays on the Law of Torts (Cambridge Mass. 1924) 18-86, p 79. 
justice replied "What is that to us? It is better that he should be undone wholly, than that the 
law should be changed for him." 
 
Even in the fifteenth century, a killer pardoned on the grounds of accident remained at 
risk of a civil action.9
 
 
16th century English law 
 
It was not until the sixteenth century that a distinction was finally drawn between 
deliberate killing and negligent killing. This was the beginning of the distinction between 
murder and manslaughter as we know it today. Manslaughter included deaths which were the 
unintentional outcomes of careless, but intentional, acts. Tree-felling again provides us with a 
good example. Cutting down trees was an inherently dangerous act (as the drawing in our 
first overhead appears to show). That is why timber cutters notoriously yelled something 
appropriate like `Stand clear!' (or `Timber!') when a tree was about to fall. It would have been 
careless not to have given such a warning, because the result might well have been the death 
of a bystander. If such a death occurred, it was treated as manslaughter rather than murder. 
While the death itself was not intended, the act which caused it was intended, and that act 
was carried out carelessly. 
 
Of course, if the inherently dangerous act of felling a tree was carried out with all due 
care, then any resulting death was merely an accident. 
 
Medieval Irish law 
 
The drawing we are discussing does not, in fact, depict an incident in England at all. It is 
set in Ireland. And when we turn to examine medieval Irish law, we discover a system far 
more elaborate and far more sophisticated than that which we have noted in England. 
 
In Ireland, the distinction between intentional killing and negligent killing was developed 
about 800 years earlier than it was in England. 
 
Medieval Irish legal manuscripts 
 
The earliest Irish legal manuscripts were written in the Old Irish language. (This was the 
language spoken from the 7th to the 9th centuries AD.) In the following centuries, medieval 
lawyers added short glosses. These glosses were designed to explain individual words and 
phrases in the original texts. In addition, the ancient texts are usually accompanied by 
expansive commentaries. These commentaries were generally composed in the period from 
the 12th to the 16th centuries. 
 
In other words, the Gaelic Irish legal materials were copied and re-copied, edited and 
added to, for a period of nearly a thousand years. Over 2,000 pages of these materials still 
survive. This constitutes the most comprehensive set of materials for any Western medieval 
legal system. But less than half of the Irish materials has even been translated. 
 
Tonight I want to focus on one ancient text in particular. This text was known as the 
Bretha Étgid. The title Bretha Étgid means `Judgements concerning Irresponsible Acts'. It 
                                                          
9 Wigcnore p 80, citing Year Book 6 Edward. IV (for the year 1466) 7,18. 
deals with the various circumstances that might surround a homicide or injury. In particular, 
it is concerned with those circumstances which make the actions of the offender more or less 
blameworthy. One such circumstance was the offender's mental state. Another was the 
presence or absence of a social justification for any risks the offender subjected the victim to. 
 
Legend of Bretha Étgid  
 
According to the legend recounted in the opening pages of this tract, Bretha Étgid  
includes the instructions of King Cormac mac Airt to his son Cairbre in the 3rd century AD. 
This legend is unlikely to be true, not least because Cormac mac Airt is in fact a euhemerised 
version of one of the pagan Celtic gods of Ireland. The language and treatment of the text 
places it rather in the Old Irish period, that is between the 7th and 9th centuries. If we say the 
8th century, we will most likely not be far wrong. 
 
Bretha Étgid  §14 has not previously been translated. But it is a very significant section. 
It introduces us to a wide range of factors, each of which influenced the outcome in a case of 
homicide or injury. 
 
BRETHA ÉTGID  §14 
 
[§ 14] Son, [I will instruct you] so that you may know [the law regarding an] 
edict or treaty together with their harmful acts and their mistaken acts and their 
irresponsible acts: 
 
[§14.1] So that the penalty for an act of anger is not paid in the case of 
negligence, nor negligence in the case of an act of anger; 
 
[§14.2] Nor the penalty for knowledge in a case of [mistake through] ignorance, 
nor of ignorance in a case of knowledge; 
 
[§14.3] Nor an intentional act in a case of [any other] irresponsible act, nor [any 
other] irresponsible act in the case of an intentional one; 
 
[§14.4] Nor a large [offence] in the case of a small one, nor a small one in the case 
of a large one.10
 
 
Bretha Étgid §14.1 -Anger versus negligence 
 
In §14.1, we find that already in the 8th century Irish law drew a distinction between 
injuries which were inflicted in ferg, `anger', and those which were inflicted through anfot, 
`negligence'. This is a distinction which the English common law was not to develop for a 
further 800 years. 
 
Bretha Étgid §14.3 – Intention 
 
Bretha Étgid §14.3 makes much the same point as § 14.1. But there is a change in 
vocabulary which alerts us to some additional sophistication in the Irish approach. Here we 
find the word comraite, `intention', being used, so that negligence was distinguished not just 
                                                          
10 For a transcription of the original Irish manuscript, see DA Binchy ed, Corpus Iuris Hibernici (6 vols; Dublin 
1978) at 1260.28-32. 
from killings in anger (or `hot blood'), but also from those in `cold blood'. And instead of the 
term anfot, ,negligence', we now have the term étged, `irresponsible act', alerting us to the 
fact that there was a multi-layered approach to negligence in Irish law. In other words, the 
law looked not just to see whether the offender was negligent, but also the context of the act 
in which that negligence occurred. 
 
Of course, none of this is screamingly obvious from the bare words of §14 alone. But the 
reader of Bretha Étgid  §14 would already have read §2, in which the terms used in §14.1 and 
§14.3 are introduced and linked. 
 
BRETHA ÉTGID §§ 2-3 
 
[§2] How many categories of irresponsible act are there? 
 
That [question] is not difficult. 
 
Four: intention, negligence, utility, folly. 
 
 
[§3] What are the names of those offences [which arise from them]? That 
[question] is not difficult. 
 
Three categories of harm: malice, negligence, negligence in addition to utility. 
 
Bretha Étgid §§ 2-3 
 
In §2, we again find the contrast between intention (in §14.3) and negligence (in §14.1); 
but also two new terms: torba, `utility', and espa, `folly'.11
 
 
The English law of homicide tended to be two-fold: culpable homicides were either very 
serious (warranting death), or just serious (warranting severe financial consequences). 
 
But in Ireland the law was threefold, as we see from §3.12
 
 Account was taken of intention 
and negligence, and then negligence was itself further divided into negligent acts which had 
an element of social utility and those which did not. Those which had no social utility were 
the acts of 'folly' referred to in §2. 
The legal consequences which flowed from each of these kinds of act are described in 
the opening section of Bretha Étgid : 
 
BRETHA ÉTGID  §1 
 
[§1] What is an exemption? The description [given to] everything exempt and 
everything entirely without legal remedy. 
                                                          
11 The meaning of torba has unfortunately been misunderstood by modern scholars as a result of Charles 
Plummer's attempt to clarify it in his article 'Notes on some passages in the Brehon laws', Ériu 9 (1923) 31-42 at 
p 32. 
12 Indeed it was at least four-fold. Irish law also treated secret murder as particularly serious - though this is not 
dealt with in this particular text. According to the medieval commentators, the penalty for secret murder was 
twice that for intentional homicide: see Ancient Laws of Ireland (6 vols; Dublin 1865-1901) vol iii at p 99.  
[§1.1] Full penalty for intention, half penalty for negligence, restitution for 
utility, exemption for true-justification. 
 
And when we study the ancient texts in detail, this is the position which emerges: 
 
Summary of position in Irish law (c. AD 750) 
 
Dangerous act 
of MALICE 
performed 
intentionally 
Dangerous act 
of FOLLY (i.e. 
performed 
irresponsibly) 
Dangerous act 
of UTILITY 
performed 
irresponsibly 
 Dangerous act of 
UTILITY 
performed  
responsibly 
full éric-fine half éric-fine 1/7 = restitution  exempt 
     
  (By AD 1100:) Dangerous act of 
UTILITY 
performed  
responsibly 
    1/21 to other workers 
 
 
Illustration: wood-cutters in England 
 
To illustrate the way this scheme worked, let us consider two merry woodcutters; one in 
England and one in Ireland. What happens if a tree they cut down lands on someone's head 
and kills them? 
 
For the position in England we can turn to the case of R v Hull,13 which was decided in 
1664. At that trial the judges confirmed that when "a man [is] lopping a tree, and when the 
arms of the tree were ready to fall, calls out to them below, take heed, and then the arms of 
the tree fall and kill a man, this is misadventure." Indeed it had been treated as misadventure 
(i.e. an accident) for at least two centuries.14
 
 However, what if the wood cutter gave no 
warning that the tree was about to fall? In medieval England the only alternative open to the 
courts was a finding of voluntary homicide. It was only in the sixteenth century that a finding 
of manslaughter was possible in such cases. 
Illustration: wood-cutters in Ireland 
 
The law on this point had developed far earlier in Ireland. 
 
BRETHA ÉTGID  §30 
 
[§30] The exemption of trees in falling, provided [there is] a warning beforehand. 
 
[Commentary] If he has observed the legal requirement for removing 
[incapacitated persons and animals] and for giving a warning, there is an 
exemption for [injuries to] idlers and persons who are present for no useful 
                                                          
13 (1664) Kelyng J 40; 84 ER 1072. 
14 Holdsworth iii 313, citing the Year Books from the reigns of Edward IV (1461-83) and Henry VII (1422-
1461). 
 
purpose. And [in all other cases] it comes down from half-compensation to a 
third of restitution. 
 
If he has not observed the legal requirement for a warning, nor of removing, it is 
treated as a careless act of utility. As a result, half-restitution is paid for an 
injury to an idler and to a person who is present for no useful purpose. 
Restitution is paid to a person who is there for a useful purpose.15
 
 
In the eighth century text of §30 we see that the law had already developed the notion of 
accident. A death which had been caused despite the lack of any intention to kill, and after all 
due care had been taken, was not a culpable homicide. In this respect the Irish law was 
already 400 years ahead of its English counterpart.16
 
 
The later medieval commentary to this provision, written about the time the English had 
finally developed the notion of accidental killing, shows a further development in Irish law. 
Those who had no good cause to be present had no claim if they did not move away once a 
warning was given. But the same was not true of persons who could not hear the warning 
because they were deaf. Nor was it true of persons who could not move away because they 
were likewise engaged in useful work.. 
 
As far as the deaf were concerned, the tree-feller had to physically escort them from the 
site. And the same was true for livestock - who would likewise derive no benefit from a mere 
verbal warning. 
 
As far as fellow-workers were concerned, a special duty of care was owed to them 
because of the fact that they could not be expected to remove themselves from the scene. If 
they were injured, a small payment equal to 1/3 of aithgin, `restitution', was payable. 
(`Restitution' was the name given to a component of the compensation for injuries. Where it 
was called for, it made up 1/7 of the total payment, which was known as the éric-fine.) 
 
The second half of the commentary I have quoted deals with the situation where the tree-
feller has not given the required warning. While cutting down the tree was still considered an 
act of social utility, he has now engaged in it in an irresponsible manner. As a result, he owes 
the full amount of restitution to those who are injured by his negligence. 
 
Contributory negligence 
 
But note that people who have no good reason to be present only get half-restitution. 
This is because they are guilty of what we now call `contributory negligence'. Certainly the 
tree-feller was negligent in not shouting a warning when the particular tree was about to fall. 
But the idlers were equally negligent in hanging around while he was at work chopping down 
trees in the first place. The compensation paid to them is therefore halved. 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 For the original Irish see CIH 274.16-23. 
16 Self-defence was likewise recognised as exculpatory: "[Ancient text:] Self-defence is exempt from liability. 
[Commentary:] It is exempt for him to kill him if he was unable to escape from him." For the Irish see CIH 
2158.9. 
 
A further illustration: injuries caused by brooches 
 
Let us look at a second example of the way the Irish scheme worked. 
 
BRETHA ÉTGID  §59 
 
[§59] The exemption of a brooch on the upper chest. 
 
[Commentary] There is an exemption for men if their brooch is on their upper chest 
at their shoulder, and there is an exemption for women if their brooch is on their 
upper chest at their breast, provided there is no protrusion beyond it. 
 
And if there is [a protrusion], it is governed by the rule of repeated injuries: 
Restitution for its first offence, half-compensation with restitution for its second 
offence, full compensation with restitution for the third offence.17
 
 
A brooch was a necessary item for keeping your cloak attached properly, so wearing a 
brooch was an act of social utility. But it had the potential to cause injury. If the brooch was 
fitted carelessly, then the first injury it caused was treated as an act of social utility performed 
irresponsibly. The appropriate fine was therefore restitution. 
 
But once one injury had occurred, the wearer was alerted to the dangerous positioning of 
the brooch. For the wearer to continue without adjusting the brooch would be an act of 
negligence. So a second injury brought the penalty for negligence. This was half the penalty 
payable for a deliberate injury. 
 
But suppose the wearer still continued to wear the brooch without adjusting it, even after 
two injuries had been caused by its dangerous state. That would show a reckless disregard for 
the safety of others. Such recklessness was treated as tantamount to an intent to injure. Any 
further injuries brought the full penalty attributable to deliberate acts. 
 
Bretha Étgid §14.2 – Mistake 
 
Note that already in the 8th century Irish law recognised mistake of fact as a mitigating 
factor (§14, §14.2). 
 
Mistake in English law 
 
Mistake as to fact emerged as a defence to homicide in English law only in the sixteenth 
century. For example, in the early 17th century case of R v Levett,18
                                                          
17 For the Irish see CIH 289.25-29. 
 the accused was acquitted 
of the murder of a woman called Frances Freeman. Levett had mistaken Freeman for a 
burglar. Frances Freeman was in fact a friend of William Levett's servant, Martha Stapleton. 
Freeman had come in secret to the Levett's house to help his servant complete a particularly 
large backlog of housework. Martha and Frances finally finished up at midnight. Just as 
Frances was about to leave, Martha thought she heard burglars trying to break in. Frances 
Freeman hid in the buttery, while Martha ran upstairs and woke William Levett. Levett 
rushed downstairs with a drawn rapier in front of him and his wife Helen behind him. It was 
18 Referred to in Cook's Case (1639) Cro. Car. 537 at 538; 79 ER 1063 at 1064. 
Helen who spotted someone in the buttery. Levett charged into the buttery, lunging with his 
rapier and killing the unfortunate Frances Freeman. 
 
William Levett was charged with murder. He would not have been guilty of murder if he 
had used such force against a real burglar. The court of King's Bench held that his intention 
was lawful, even though it was based on a mistake of fact. As a result Levett was innocent of 
both murder and manslaughter. 
 
It was lucky for Mr Levett that his case had not been heard a century or so earlier. 
Unless, of course, he'd been living under Irish law at the time. 
 
Mistake in Irish law 
 
In Ireland, the basic principle that it was permissible to kill a thief caught in the act was 
set out in §115 of the original text of Bretha Étgid . 
 
BRETHA ÉTGID  §115 
 
[§115] Every lawless person is completely without recourse to law. 
 
Four hundred years or so before Levett's case was decided, a medieval Irish lawyer added 
this explanation of §115: 
 
[Commentary] i.e. there is an exemption for killing the thief, if you don't know his 
name, and don't recognise him, and are unable to arrest him at the time he 
commits the trespass. 
 
And there is an exemption for every person who shall have been killed in mistake 
for such a thief.19
 
 
The rule which allowed you to kill a burglar in your home was something of a special 
case. It also required you to show that you had no means of arresting the burglar without 
violence, or of identifying him for future arrest. In most other cases where the defendant has 
attacked an innocent person in mistake for a guilty person, the defendant had to pay half the 
normal penalty. 
 
For example, Bretha Étgid  § 13 says: 
 
BRETHA ÉTGID  §13 
 
[§ 13] Son, [I will instruct you] so that you may know [the law regarding] a law-
abiding man mistaken for an outlaw and an outlaw mistaken for a law-abiding 
man. 
 
[§13.1] Half the penalty is the full amount for the first of these situations. 
 
[§ 13.2] A quarter for the second situation because of the person he has been 
mistaken for.20
                                                          
19 For the Irish see CIH 1161.15-17. 
 
20 For the Irish see CIH 1067.30-31. 
 
 
§13.1 illustrates the general law of mistake. The assailant thinks he is attacking an 
outlaw, someone he is entitled to attack. But instead he kills an innocent person. As a result, 
he pays half the penalty he would normally pay for the homicide of that innocent person. 
 
Attempt in Irish law 
 
§13.2 is even more interesting for the sophistication of the legal principle underlying it. 
Here the assailant intends to kill an innocent person, but instead mistakenly kills someone 
whom he actually had a right to kill. This time he pays a quarter of the normal penalty for 
homicide. But that quarter-penalty is not paid to the outlaw. Rather it is paid to the innocent 
person for the unsuccessful attempt to kill him. 
 
Here is a table setting out the gradation of attempt fines in Irish law:21
 
 
ATTEMPT c. AD 700 
 
Penalty 1/7 1/4 8/21 1/2 2/3 
With  
naked 
weapon 
 drawing 
weapon 
hunting 
down 
damage to 
clothing 
injury 
Without 
naked 
weapon 
mere 
statement 
hunting 
down 
damage to 
clothing 
injury  
 
An unsuccessful assailant did not pay the fine for the injury he intended to inflict. Rather 
he paid a fraction of that fine. The particular fraction varied in accordance with how close he 
came to inflicting the intended injury. For example, suppose an assailant threw a spear at 
someone in an unsuccessful attempt to kill them. The assailant paid half the penalty for 
murder if the spear damaged the victim's clothes, and one-quarter if it missed altogether. 
 
The same thing applies in Bretha Étgid  § 13.2. In throwing his spear at the outlaw by 
mistake, the assailant has also missed the innocent person he intended to kill. (The fact that 
he has killed the outlaw does not affect that conclusion.) The appropriate penalty paid to his 
intended victim is therefore one-quarter of the penalty for the injury he intended to inflict. 
 
Attempt in English law 
 
England was without attempt laws until the sixteenth century. In the 14th century some 
courts solved the dilemma by finding the accused guilty of the principal offence, even for 
mere intent.22 But most failed attempts went unpunished. It was not until the sixteenth century 
that the common law finally adopted the solution developed in the Court of Star Chamber, 
and tried attempted felonies as misdemeanours.23
 
 
                                                          
21See Neil McLeod, Assault and attempted murder in Brehon law', (1998) 33 The Irish jurist 351-91. 
22 Holdsworth iii 373. 
23 Holdsworth iii 434. 
In other words, Irish law showed remarkable sophistication in its treatment of the mental 
element in offences against the person. By the eighth century it had developed a range of 
concepts which did not emerge in England until the sixteenth century. 
 
Bretha Étgid  §14.4 - Large and small offences 
 
Irish law had at its heart a set scale of payments for injuries of various kinds. Each 
payment consisted of a fixed éric-fine plus a fraction of the victim's honour-price. (Each rank 
in society had its own honour-price. These ranged from a yearling heifer, for young landless 
men, to 21 milk-cows for a king.24
 
 ) 
Classification of injuries: AD 700 
 
Injury éric-fine (milk-cows) Honour-price 
white-blow 1 1/21 
lump-blow 2 1/7 
bloodshed 2.5 1/4 
bandage-wound 3 1/3 
confinement to bed 3.5 1/2 
deadly bed-wound 10.5 full 
death 21 full 
 
As Bretha Étgid  §14.4 emphasises, a judge had to be aware of the characteristics of 
each type of injury so as to be able to apply the appropriate penalty. 
 
White blow 
 
The white blow was an injury which did not leave any lasting mark or cause any 
lingering pain. In included things like violent pushing and shoving. 
 
Lump blow 
 
A lump blow was a battery which left a swelling or a bruise or an abrasion. 
 
Bloodshed 
 
In order for a cut to be serious enough to warrant the description `bloodshed', it had to 
drip at least five drops of blood onto the ground. 
 
Bandage-wound 
 
A bandage wound was, naturally enough, a wound requiring a bandage. The injured 
person was still ambulatory, and could move around the countryside unaided.25
                                                          
24 Neil McLeod, `Interpreting Early Irish Law: status and currency (Part I)' Zeitschrift fur celtische Philologie 41 
(1986) 46-65; (Part II) 42 (1987) 41-115. 
 
25 The commentaries distinguished an upper and lower bandage wound on the basis on the degree to which 
victims could still get about. A lower bandage wound did not interfere with the victims' movements about the 
kingdom; whereas the more serious bandage wound saw them confined to their own townland. (See the Irish 
material at CIH 699.5-7 and the discussion in DA Binchy, 'Sick-maintenance in Irish Law', Ériu 17 (1934) 78-
134 at pp 130-132.) 
Standard bed-wound 
 
`Confinement to bed' was required for injuries such as fractured skulls. The term was 
applied to any injury which prevented the victim from moving around outside. According to 
the medieval commentators, the victim was only able to go to the toilet if someone supported 
his arm.26
 
 
Deadly bed-wound 
 
The `deadly bed-wound' was an injury which left the victim in danger of death. The 
victim could no longer hobble to the toilet with support. They could no longer even turn from 
side to side without someone lifting them. Deadly bed-wounds included wounds which had 
penetrated through the skull to the brain. The term was also applied to injuries which left the 
victim with `three floods of bloodshed': i.e. with blood flowing from their wound, and being 
vomited from their mouth, and being passed in their urine.27
 
 
For the three most serious categories of injuries, the victim was also entitled to their 
medical costs.28
 
 
Compensation vs capital punishment. 
 
In medieval England, the punishment for the more serious forms of murder was death. 
Indeed, death was technically the punishment for the less serious forms of murder as well. 
However, in those cases the guilty person could usually avoid death by seeking a royal 
pardon or by using the escape hatch into the ecclesiastical courts known as `benefit of 
clergy'.29
 
 
In Ireland the penalty for homicide remained a financial one no matter what form the 
killing took. However, the penalty increased with the degree of criminality involved in the 
killing. Furthermore, the penalties were set so high that the malicious killer would need the 
support of his kin in making the payments. If the killer's kin were unable or unwilling to 
support him, his life became forfeit. Defaulting murderers were hanged. Those who defaulted 
on fines for negligent manslaughter were set adrift on the sea in a boat without oars, and left 
to pray that they would wash up further down the coast where they might survive in a life of 
servitude.30
 
 But most kins could be expected to support a kin-member by paying his fines 
unless he was a reprobate. 
Attempts to suppress the taking of 'blood-money' 
 
The Irish disinclination for capital punishment was viewed with horror by the Church in 
the first millennium and by the English in the second. Both tried to stamp out the practice of 
accepting monetary compensation for homicide and to replace it with hanging. Both were 
unsuccessful. 
 
                                                          
26 See CIH 699.8-9. 
27 See N McLeod, `Crólige mbáis', in the forthcoming festschrift for Professor Gear6id Mac Eoin (D Ó Baoill & 
D Ó hAodha eds) and the Irish material at CIH 699.9-11. 
28 See McLeod, `Crólige mbáis' (forthcoming). 
29 JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (2nd ed, London 1979), pp 420, 422-3 and 429. 
30 See Ancient Laws of Ireland vol i at p 15 and Mary Byrne, 'On the punishment of setting adrift', Ériu 11 
(1932) 97-102. 
The Church attempted to suppress the institution of the éric-fine in two ways. Firstly, the 
Church itself refused to accept blood-money for the murder of clerics.31 However, it did 
accept the honour-price component of the payment, and introduced a replacement system of 
monetary penances which seems designed to serve the same financial end as the eric-fine.32
 
 
(This may even have been a subtle attempt to divert all compensation payments away from 
kindreds and towards the Church.) 
It also launched a propaganda assault, by playing the `Saint Patrick card'. The Church 
had a major role in compiling the massive texts of ancient Irish law. It inserted a story about 
St Patrick into the Introduction of the most famous of these, the Senchus Már. According to 
this story, St Patrick's charioteer had been murdered soon after St Patrick's arrival in the 5th 
century. St Patrick had refused to accept an éric-fine for the loss of the man and had instead 
insisted on the death penalty. This ingenious fable had no impact on the law, however. The 
jurists simply distinguished the case in the time-honoured fashion of judges. They said the 
verdict applied in St Patrick's case only, since only St Patrick could ensure the reception of 
the condemned man's soul into heaven. And there the matter rested until the 12th century and 
the arrival of the English. 
 
The English colonists themselves did not expend too much energy attempting to suppress 
Irish law. Instead they adopted it enthusiastically as their own. However, the authorities in 
England were constantly aghast at the way the colonists in Ireland were abandoning the 
English common law in favour of Irish law. A series of apparently quite unsuccessful statutes 
were passed to reverse the process. An Ordinance of Kilkenny of 1351 prohibited the use of 
Irish law, asserting that it was so barbarous that it ought not to be called law at all.33 This was 
so unsuccessful that an even more strident attempt to wean the English colonists back to 
English law was made in the Statute of Kilkenny 14 years later.34 Again this appears to have 
been to no avail. As late as 1495 King Henry VII was forced to pass a statute for Ireland 
entitled `An Act that no person take any money or amends for the Death or Murder of his 
Friend or Kinsman'.35
 
 
In Ireland the common law was up against a legal system which had known for many 
centuries how to distinguish murder from negligence, culpable homicide from self defence, 
and malice from accident. The English settlers appeared to prefer it. I think, perhaps, we may 
have touched here on some of the reasons for that. 
 
                                                          
31 This was enshrined into the law in the ancient text known as Bretha Nemed: "What are the good 
qualifications ennobling a church? It is not difficult: ... let it not accept the price of innocent blood; 
further let it forgive everyone through repentance." See Liam Brearnach, 'The first third of the Bretha 
Nemed toísech', Ériu 40 (1989) 1-40 at 9. 
32 See the sources cited in Fergus Kelly, A Guide to Early Irish Law (Dublin 1988 [repr. 1991]), at p 43. 
33 Ordinances of Kilkenny 1351 c 16. 
34 It is agreed and established that ... [in the case of any] Englishman, having disputes with any other 
Englishman ... that they shall sue each other at the common law; and that no Englishman be governed in the 
termination of their disputes by March law nor Brehon [ie Irish] law, which reasonably ought not to be called 
law, being a bad custom; but they shall be governed, as is right, by the common law of the land ..." 
35 Henry VII (Irish Statutes) 1495 c 11. 
